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Acknowledging the Gender in Anti-
Transgender Discrimination
David B. Cruzt
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the primary federal
employment nondiscrimination statute, prohibits discrimination
"because of,"' "based on,"2 or "on account of'" race, color, religion,
national origin, or sex. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or "Commission") has interpreted Title VII's
ban on sex discrimination to forbid discrimination against an
employee or job applicant because the person is transgender.'
Federal agency employers are bound by this conclusion in
complaints taken up to the EEOC.5 Courts should give this
interpretation some measure of deference, and, regardless, it is
correct. Older judicial arguments against such coverage either do
not carry weight in light of current approaches to federal statutory
interpretation or are facilely sophistic.6 More recently voiced
scholarly concerns or reservations about this interpretation of the
Act, sometimes presented as parts of more theoretical inquiries,
would provide inadequate reason to reject the doctrinal conclusion
t. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I
thank my fellow panelists and the audience at the 2013 Law & Inequality
symposium at the University of Minnesota, Professor Anna Kirkland, Jody
Herman, and Jon Davidson for their helpful comments and questions, as well as
Gus Paras for excellent research assistance. This does not imply any of them
necessarily agrees with me on particular points, and any errors would of course be
mine.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
2. Id. at §§ 2000e-3(b), 2000e-16(a).
3. Id. at § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).
4. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *10-11 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012).
5. See, e.g., Steven M. Ranieri, "If at First You Don't Succeed ... :" An
Argument Giving Federal Agencies the Ability to Challenge Adverse Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Decisions in Federal Court, ARMY LAW.,
Sept. 2008, at 23, 23 ("Neither the originally enacted nor the amended versions of
Title VII provide a mechanism for federal agencies to challenge the EEOC's award
of remedies in federal court. The Title VII and the EEOC implementing
regulations act in concert to make EEOC decisions regarding both liability and
remedies binding upon federal agencies."). But see id. at 24 (arguing by extension
of Supreme Court precedent "that adverse EEOC decisions are not binding against
federal agencies when complainants seek compensatory damages").
6. See infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
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that anti-transgender discrimination categorically is sex
discrimination under Title VII.7
By transgender or trans, I mean to include a broad range of
people whose gender expression or whose gender identity, their
inner sense of themselves as female or male (or, less often, as both
or neither), differs from the sex to which they were assigned at
birth." In some cases, transgender persons may have had medical
or surgical procedures to bring their bodies into alignment with
their gender identity.' However, not all transgender people will
need or want to medically or surgically transition.10
The EEOC is the federal agency chiefly responsible for
enforcement of the nation's employment nondiscrimination laws,
and it has concluded that anti-transgender discrimination is sex
discrimination, which it held in a case brought by Mia Macy." It
was from the EEOC that Ms. Macy ultimately sought relief for the
employment discrimination she believed she faced. 12 Ms. Macy
had applied for a job with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, but the Bureau changed its mind about
hiring her after learning that she was transitioning from male to
female.13  Macy formally complained to the Bureau, but it
concluded that Macy's claim of anti-transgender discrimination
did not state a claim for sex discrimination covered by Title VII.14
Macy appealed to the EEOC, and in April 2012, the Commission
unanimously ruled in her favor in Macy v. Holder." Transgender
7. See infra notes 106-172 and accompanying text.
8. See TRANSGENDER RIGHTS xiv (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang &
Shannon Price Minter eds., 2006) ("Since about 1995, the meaning of transgender
has begun to settle, and the term is now generally used to refer to individuals
whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social expectations for
their assigned sex at birth.").
9. See E. Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual,
Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT'L J.
TRANSGENDERISM 165, 170-71 (2011).
10. See id.
11. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, *11 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20,
2012); see also id. at *11 n.16 (noting that "[tihe Commission previously took this
position in an amicus brief docketed with the district court in the Western District
of Texas on Oct. 17, 2011 .....
12. Id. at *2.
13. Id. at *1-2.
14. Id. at *2. This account comes from the EEOC opinion. Id. at *1-3. That
opinion explains that its rendering of the facts is "taken from the EEO Counselor's
Report and the formal complaint of discrimination." Id. at *1 n.1. This Article
makes no representations as to what the actual facts of the Bureau's conduct were.
15. Id. at *11; Dana Beyer et al., New Title VII and EEOC Rulings Protect
Transgender Employees, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER,
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plaintiffs had won victories under Title VII before, but usually
because they were able to demonstrate discrimination based on
sex stereotyping in their particular factual circumstances.1 6 Such
an approach remains open after Macy and thus will continue to
offer an additional avenue of protection for transgender workers.
So too could a law like the proposed federal Employment Non-
Discrimination Act expressly banning discrimination on the basis
of gender identity or expression. 7 Independent of those other legal
approaches, the Macy ruling makes clear the great reach of the sex
discrimination prohibition in Title VII,' even if it is, as of this
writing, one of only two extant published adjudications holding
that anti-transgender discrimination is always sex discrimination
under Title VII.'9
http://transgenderlawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/201401/TitleVII-Report-
Final012414.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
16. See, e.g., Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d
653, 667 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding Title VII reached discrimination against
transgender plaintiff whose gender expression was regarded by employer as not
conforming to what employer perceived plaintiffs sex to be).
17. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. (as
passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because of such
individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity. . . .").
18. Title VII is law, and the aim of this Article is to embrace the interpretation
of that law as forbidding anti-transgender discrimination and to demonstrate that
the reasons some persons might prefer trans-specific laws against discrimination
are not sufficient reasons to shrink from using the full sweep of Title VII. Space
constraints preclude me from exploring the more academic question of which
avenue of protection might, in some sense, be superior.
19. The district court ruled in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. that
discrimination against a trans person for transitioning was by definition sex
discrimination, 581 F. Supp. 821, 825 (1983), but the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed, 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85, 1087 (7th Cir. 1984).
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 212 (D.D.C. 2008), suggested it
might be time to revisit that issue ("[1It may be time to revisit Judge Grady's
conclusion in Ulane I that discrimination against transsexuals because they are
transsexuals is literally' discrimination 'because of... sex.'"), and did conclude that
discrimination based on Diane Schroer's plans "to change her anatomical sex" was
"literally 'discrimination because of sex.'" Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d
293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (citations omitted). The bulk of the court's analysis,
however, went to its alternative holding basing liability for discrimination on
particular evidence in the case that the Library of Congress discriminated against
Schroer on the basis of sex stereotypes. See id. at 305 (addressing reactions to
"photographs of Schroer in traditionally feminine attire" and beliefs concerning her
especially masculine prior work).
The original opinion from the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. City of Salem, 369
F.3d 912 (6th Cir. June 1, 2004), superseded by 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. Aug. 5,
2004), appeared to say that anti-trans discrimination is per se sex discrimination:
Even if Smith had alleged discrimination based only on his self-
identification as a transsexual-as opposed to his specific appearance and
260 Law and Inequality [Vol. 32:257
Although the matter is unclear,20 the EEOC interpretation of
Title VII in Macy should be entitled to some measure of deference
from courts2 ' adjudicating claims of anti-transgender
discrimination. The Supreme Court in 1971 said that "the
administrative interpretation by the" EEOC, the agency with
"enforcement responsibility" for Title VII, "is entitled to great
deference."22 In addition, the Macy decision was the product of a
formal adjudication, which the Court has suggested entitles an
administrative statutory interpretation to more deference.22  It is
also an eminently reasonable interpretation of the statute, the
best in my view, as explicated below. On the other hand, Macy's
view of Title VII is an interpretation of law, and its reasoning was
grounded particularly in Supreme Court case law, which is a
behavior-this claim too is actionable pursuant to Title VII. By definition,
transsexuals are individuals who fail to conform to stereotypes about how
those assigned a particular sex at birth should act, dress, and self-identify.
Ergo, identification as a transsexual is the statement or admission that
one wishes to be the opposite sex or does not relate to one's birth sex. Such
an admission-for instance the admission by a man that he self-identifies
as a woman and/or that he wishes to be a woman-itself violates the
prevalent sex stereotype that a man should perceive himself as a man.
Discrimination based on transsexualism is rooted in the insistence that
sex (organs) and gender (social classification of a person as belonging to
one sex or the other) coincide. This is the very essence of sex stereotyping.
Id. at 921-22. This categorical language was removed when the panel issued a
modified opinion. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. Aug. 5,
2004) (omitting this paragraph), superseding 369 F.3d 912.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit almost held that anti-trans
discrimination is by definition sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause, but stopped just short. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir.
2011). I discuss Glenn infra at text accompanying notes 66-90.
20. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and
the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1938 (2006) ("(Tlhe Court has consistently
refused to define what level of deference the [EEOCI's regulations are owed,
preferring to retain a broad and undefined discretion to accept or reject agency
analysis.").
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988)
("[Tihe EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be
entitled to deference.") (citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761
(1979)). Accord Hart, supra note 20, at 1938 (concluding that "the Court is making
a mistake by refusing to respect the EEOC's interpretation of the statutes it has
been charged with enforcing. . . ."). But see Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) ("Even for an agency able to claim all the authority
possible under Chevron, deference to its statutory interpretation is called for only
when the devices ofjudicial construction have been tried and found to yield no clear
sense of congressional intent.").
22. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (contrasting
"an interpretation contained in an opinion letter," entitled not to deference but only
to such respect as warranted by the interpretation's persuasiveness, with an
interpretation "arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
comment rulemaking[,]" which is entitled to deference).
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factor that reduces the amount of deference the Supreme Court
holds warranted, even when adopted in formal adjudications.2 4
The EEOC position in Macy is also a newer one for the agency,25
not one consistently held since Title VII was adopted.2 6 This could
reduce the requisite deference,27  though the EEOC has a
justification for its new position-new Supreme Court and lower
court case law'-and thus is not merely offering "nothing more
than an agency's convenient litigating position," as the Court has
characterized some past agency interpretations to which it has
refused deference. Indeed, the EEOC appears to be consistently
adhering to and enforcing this understanding of Title VII in its for-
cause determinations and ensuing settlements .o
Courts should, however, not need to resolve definitively the
level of deference due to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII in
Macy. In the past, the Supreme Court has ducked that issue when
it concluded that the EEOC was correct. As it said in one case:
We find the EEOC rule not only a reasonable one, but the
position we would adopt even if there were no formal rule and
we were interpreting the statute from scratch. Because we so
24. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.11 (2007)
(citing Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 336, n.5 (2000))
("[W]e ... decline to defer to the EEOC's adjudicatory positions. The EEOC's views
in question are based on its misreading of [one Supreme Court
precedent]. ... Agencies have no special claim to deference in their interpretation
of our decisions. Nor do we see reasonable ambiguity in the statute itself.. .. ").
25. But cf Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 n.16
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012) ("The Commission previously took this position in an
amicus brief docketed with the district court in the Western District of Texas on
Oct. 17, 2011, where it explained that '[i]t is the position of the EEOC that
disparate treatment of an employee because he or she is transgender is
discrimination 'because of. . . sex' under Title VII."') (quoting EEOC Amicus Brief
for Plaintiff, at 1, Pacheco v. Freedom Buick GMC Truck, 2011 WL 5410751 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 07-116).
26. See id. ("With this decision, we expressly overturn ... contrary earlier
decisions from the Commission.").
27. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) ("The
EEOC's interpretation does not fare well under these standards. As an initial
matter, the position taken by the Commission 'contradicts the position which [it]
had enunciated at an earlier date, closer to the enactment of the governing
statute.'") (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)).
28. See, e.g., Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 n.16 (overturning earlier contrary
interpretations "in light of the recent developments in the case law described
above").
29. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988).
30. See, e.g., Erik Roldan, Victory! Lambda Legal Helps South Dakota
Transgender Employee Win Landmark Settlement After Wrongful Termination,
LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/sd_20130916_victory-south-dakota-transgender-
employee (recounting two settlements of charges of sex discrimination brought by
transgender employees and describing EEOC backing in one of them).
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clearly agree with the EEOC, there is no occasion to defer and
31
no point in asking what kind of deference, or how much.
The EEOC's interpretation of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination
as forbidding anti-transgender discrimination is correct, and thus
questions of judicial deference are somewhat academic here.
The starting place for statutory interpretation, Title VII's
text, supports understanding anti-transgender discrimination as
unlawful sex discrimination. The main ban in Title VII declares
that
[ilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.32
Other provisions of Title VII ban discrimination "on account of' or
"based on" sex,3 3 but there is little to no indication that the various
31. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). Subsection 2000e-2(a) also makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (2012) specifies that
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor
organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-
the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or
published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an
employer or membership in or any classification or referral for
employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification
or referral for employment by such an employment agency, or relating to
admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide
apprenticeship or other training by such a joint labor-management
committee, indicating any preference, limitation, specification, or
discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, except
that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin
when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment.
(Emphasis added). Section 2000e-16(a) specifies that
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment
(except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United
States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in
executive agencies as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees
and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds),
in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory
Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia
having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the
judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions in the
competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution, and in the
Government Printing Office, the Government Accountability Office, and
262 [Vol. 32:257
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phrasings were meant to bear different meanings.3 4 And Title VII
provides that, except where otherwise specified, "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice."
If "sex" in Title VII includes not just biological but also social
aspects and psychological aspects, such as a person's gender
identity, then discrimination on the basis of sex would include
discrimination on the basis of gender identity. Hence, anti-
transgender discrimination, understood as based on gender
identity, would be actionable sex discrimination. Jillian Weiss has
advanced such an argument in detail, building upon contemporary
medical understandings of "sex" and the principle that the specific
intent of Congress in enacting Title VII in 1964 should not be
controlling, or at least likely would not be so treated by the
Supreme Court, as opposed to the plain meaning of the text."
Whether Professor Weiss's argument is likely to be wholly
judicially embraced is not wholly clear. In insisting that "the
meaning of the term sex has changed since 1964, and now includes
the concepts of gender and gender identity,"" the argument seems
that it might require interpreting a statute by reference to the
plain meaning of its language at the time a court resolves a
the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(Emphasis added). And § 2000e-16b(a) provides that
All personnel actions affecting the Presidential appointees described in
section 1219 of Title 2 or the State employees described in section 2000e-
16c of this title shall be made free from any discrimination based
on ... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, within the meaning of
section 2000e-16 of this title ....
(Emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUsING DISCRIMINATION LAW 48-49 n.20
(1983) ("No court has yet indicated that any significance is to be attached to these
variations in the way Title VIII [a different antidiscrimination statute] expresses
its 'because of requirement."). But cf Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex
to Relationships, 25 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 220 (2012) (asserting that "Congress
provided broader protection for federal employees" under Title VII than for other
covered employees); id. at 221 (asserting more guardedly that "Congress may have
meant for federal workers to have broader protections. . . .") (emphasis added).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
36. See, e.g., Jillian Todd Weiss, Transgender Identity, Textualism, and the
Supreme Court: What Is the "Plain Meaning" of "Sex" in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964?, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 573, 623-24 (2009) (quoting and
citing Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983) rev'd, 742
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984)).
37. See id.
38. Id. at 638.
263
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controversy. Whether or not statutory interpreters adopt a "strict
plain meaning" reading of the text or a broader "traditional plain
meaning" approach that attends to "the overall statutory
structure, statutory goals and purposes, and legislative history" of
the text,"3 they commonly are referring to the plain meaning of the
words at the time the legislature enacted the law.40 More "dynamic"
approaches to statutory interpretation, however, could support
Weiss's claims." Noted authority on statutory interpretation
professor Bill Eskridge has, for example, praised "[tihe Supreme
Court's dynamic interpretation of Title VII" when he judged that
the Court's decision construing the statute to allow affirmative
action "continued the government's commitment to the public
values in Title VII in light of changed circumstances that
threatened to undermine those values decisively."42
Courts should not even have to resolve this question of the
breadth of the term "sex" in Title VII and whether it includes
"gender identity" as an aspect of sex, though. As noted above,
Title VII makes it unlawful to "discriminate" "on the basis of" (or
"because of" or "on account of") sex, and that is enough to reach
anti-transgender discrimination. This is true even if "sex" were
taken to refer only to physical (and social) divisions of the human
species into males and females," and not to include the
psychological component of sex that increasing numbers of doctors
39. Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why It Matters:
Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain
Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955, 961 (2005) (articulating these two variants
of "plain meaning" interpretation).
40. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 125-26 (1990) (Scalia, J.,joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (interpreting statute restrictively
because '"falsely made' had a well-established common-law meaning at the time the
relevant language of [the statute] was enacted") (emphasis added), quoted in Craig,
supra note 39, at 1016.
41. Cf Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 339 (1978)
(opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that "Congress' resolve not to
incorporate a static definition of discrimination into Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964] is not surprising"); id. at 340 ("Congress intended the meaning of the
statute's prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the
Constitution.").
42. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1516 (1987) (discussing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979)).
43. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Even if the
decisions that define the word 'sex' in Title VII as referring only to anatomical or
chromosomal sex are still good law ... the Library's refusal to hire Schroer after
being advised that she planned to change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex
reassignment surgery was literally discrimination 'because of. . . sex.'").
264 [Vol. 32:257
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are recognizing includes "gender identity."" A transgender person
is defined in terms of a difference between one's natally assigned
sex and one's gender identity or gender expression.4 5 An employer
can only know or believe that a person is transgender if the
employer knows or has a belief about the employee's natally
assigned sex (say, male) and a mismatch between that sex and the
employee's gender identity or expression (say, female). Thus, if an
employer discriminates against a person because the employee is
transgender, then the employer has literally discriminated against
her on the basis of her sex. Were the employee's assigned sex
female rather than male, for example, there would be no
discrepancy between her sex and her gender identity or
expression, she would not be transgender, and the employer would
not be discriminating against her on that basis.
While the consequences of this interpretation of
"discriminat[ion] . . . on the basis of.. . sex" may strike some as
broad, nothing in the text of Title VII precludes this "plain"
interpretation 46 of the statutory language. The text of the statute
does immediately make an exception to its proscription: Title VII
allows an employer "to hire and employ employees .. . on the basis
of... sex,... in those certain instances where ... sex .. . is a bona
fide occupational qualification [or BFOQ] reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."
If anything, however, the narrowness of this BFOQ exception-it
is an exception for 'occupational' qualifications limited "to
'certain instances' where sex discrimination is 'reasonably
necessary' to the 'normal operation' of the 'particular' business"'-
suggests the breadth of the main ban.
44. JULIE GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX MA'TERS 89
(2012).
45. Nikki Burrill & Valita Fredland, The Forgotten Patient: A Health Provider's
Guide to Providing Comprehensive Care for Transgender Patients, 9 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 69, 71 (2012).
46. But cf Bakke, 438 U.S. at 339 (referring to Congress's "refusal precisely to
define that racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit" with Title VI and
thus, presumably, "[tihe cryptic nature of the language employed in Title VI").
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
48. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). See also id.
("The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it
narrowly[,] ... grounded on both the language and the legislative history of§ 703."). That the Supreme Court has ruled that this is a very narrow exception
counts more as a precedential reason supporting my and the EEOC's interpretation
than as a textual reason.
265
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Title VII's purposes are served by this interpretation of the
statute." As the Supreme Court has understood Title VII, its
primary purpose is "the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace."5 0 The statutory interpretation adopted by the EEOC
in Macy can help ameliorate the subordinate status of a group of
people defined in terms of sex. Like most of Title VII, it helps
combat a pernicious tendency in at least U.S. society to give unjust
significance to circumstances of birth unrelated to ability, that is,
a tendency to try to make biology into destiny." Trans people
should not be deprived of equal employment opportunity because
of their gender identity or expression or people's reactions to it.
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII, is a
remedial statute 52 designed to protect people from a range of forms
of workplace discrimination, it should be construed broadly."
Treating anti-transgender discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination is consistent not simply with Title VII's text and
purpose, but with simple justice as well. 4 In contemporary U.S.
49. Selecting a level of generality is a non-mechanical and frequently contested
process. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1062-63 (1990). Choosing a level that
is not the most specific possible, see, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127
n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., arguing for substantive due process
doctrine that claimed rights should be identified at "the most specific level at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified"), is, I believe, warranted in this case based upon reflection on the
purposes of Congress to eliminate invidious discrimination in employment and to
preserve only a limited realm of employer discretion when it comes to the
enumerated forbidden grounds of discrimination.
50. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979).
51. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
997, 1024-25 (2002) (describing "history of the use of 'natural' differences to
subordinate" different groups in U.S. society).
52. "Title VII is a broad remedial measure, designed 'to assure equality of
employment opportunities.'" Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982)
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
53. See, e.g., Washington Cnty. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981) ("As
Congress itself has indicated, a 'broad approach' to the definition of equal
employment opportunity is essential to overcoming and undoing the effect of
discrimination .... We must therefore avoid interpretations of Title VII that
deprive victims of discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional
mandate.") (quoting S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1964)); Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding of
Title VII that "under longstanding principles of statutory construction, the Act
should 'be given a liberal interpretation. . .') (quoting Piedmont & N.R. Co. v. ICC,
286 U.S. 299, 311-312 (1932)).
54. Anna Kirkland, What's at Stake in Transgender Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination, 32 SIGNS 83, 108 (2006) (characterizing Title VII protection against
anti-transgender discrimination as a "new group benefit ... required by justice on
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society, gainful employment is effectively a necessity for most
adults. It is true that trans people have achieved distinction in
careers in the military, higher education, entertainment, and
countless other fields." Nevertheless, the largest, most systematic
national survey on the subject, the National Transgender
Discrimination Survey," has found that transgender and other
gender non-conforming people as a group "face injustice at every
turn: in childhood homes, in school systems that promise to
shelter and educate, in harsh and exclusionary workplaces, at the
grocery store, the hotel front desk, in doctors' offices and
emergency rooms, before judges and at the hands of landlords,
police officers, health care workers and other service providers."7
The respondents to this survey "lived in extreme poverty," "nearly
four times more likely to have a household income of less than
$10,000 [per] year compared to the" population average.5" They
"experienced unemployment at twice the rate of the general
population at the time of the survey, with rates for [trans and
gender-nonconforming] people of color up to four times the
national unemployment rate."" "Ninety percent . .. of those
surveyed reported experiencing harassment, mistreatment or
discrimination on the job or took actions like hiding who they are
to avoid it.""o "Forty-seven percent ... said they had experienced
an adverse job outcome, such as being fired, not hired[,] or denied
a promotion because of being transgender or gender non-
conforming.""
independent grounds: relieving the oppression, subordination, exclusion, and
torment of trans people").
55. See, e.g., Joanne Herman, Transgender Success Stories, ADVOCATE.COM
(Oct. 2, 2006, 12:00 AM),
http://www.advocate.com/politics/commentary/2006/10/02/transgender-success-
stories.
56. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (Nat'l Ctr. for Transgender
Equal. and Nat'l Gay and Lesbian Task Force 2011), available at www.thetask-
force.org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds-full.pdf; see Marissa L. Walters, compiler,
Keynote Address from Mara Keisling, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 203, 207 (2013) ("[Olur
organization, along with the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force ... did a study,
called the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, where we interviewed
sixty five hundred trans people. It's the largest survey ever done to this point.").
57. GRANT ET AL., supra note 56, at 2.
58. Id.





I recount all this to underscore the problems trans people
face in maintaining gainful, lawful employment62 and thus the
importance of the availability of legal protection against anti-
transgender discrimination. As of this writing, only seventeen
states and the District of Columbia" have laws expressly
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of gender
identity, and there is no federal statute that does so expressly."
So, accepting the text-based interpretation of Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination as reaching anti-transgender discrimination is
vitally important from a justice perspective."
As the EEOC's Macy decision properly recognized, building
on the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Glenn v. Brumby," Supreme Court precedent also supports the
conclusion that anti-transgender discrimination is sex
discrimination under Title VII. Glenn properly recounted that the
Supreme Court subjects sex-classifying government action to a
form of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
intermediate scrutiny,6 7 and rejects action "on the basis of gender
stereotypes."" To understand what constitutes impermissible sex
discrimination through sex or gender stereotyping, the Court of
Appeals drew freely upon Title VII precedent, particularly the
Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins." Glenn
took Price Waterhouse to stand for the conclusions that
62. "Overall, [sixteen percent] said they had been compelled to work in the
underground economy for income (such as doing sex work or selling drugs)." Id.
63. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map, AMER. CIV.
LIB. UNION, (last visited Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-
discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map.
64. Remember, Title VII extends to discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex; the Americans with Disabilities Act expressly
excludes much anti-trans discrimination from its coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1)
(2012) (defining "the term 'disability'" to exclude "transvestism, transsexualism,
pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders"). The proposed federal
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (or ENDA) would forbid covered employers
from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, but it
would need to be passed by both Houses of Congress, which might be challenging in
the current political climate.
65. This is true even if direct enforcement of bans on anti-transgender
discrimination are not robustly enforced. Cf DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE:
ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
(2011).
66. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
67. Id. at 1315-16 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)).
6& Id. at 1319.
69. See, e.g., id. at 1316 (addressing Price Waterhouse); id. at 1317-19 & nn. 5-
7 (addressing lower court Title VII decisions)
268 [Vol. 32:257
2014] ANTI-TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION
"discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype is sex-based
discrimination [" and that "Title VII barred not just discrimination
because of biological sex, but also gender stereotyping-failing to
act and appear according to expectations defined by gender.""
Such reliance on Title VII sex discrimination cases in the equal
protection context is largely unproblematic."
Drawing on legal scholarship, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the relevance of these statutory and constitutional restrictions on
sex stereotyping in a way that seems correct, if broad. According
to Glenn, "[a] person is defined as transgender precisely because of
the perception that his or her behavior transgresses gender
stereotypes." The court next quoted Ilona Turner for the
proposition that "[tihe very acts that define transgender people as
transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender-
appropriate appearance and behavior."73 The Glenn court also
cited Taylor Flynn as "defining transgender persons as those
whose 'appearance, behavior, or other personal characteristics
differ from traditional gender norms.'"74 "There is thus a
congruence," the Glenn court concluded, "between discriminating
against transgender and transsexual individuals and
discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms.
There are a couple of significant things to note about this
passage. First, it refers to both gender stereotypes and gender
norms. Price Waterhouse had spoken of sex stereotyping. 76 As
others have helpfully noted before, stereotypes can be descriptive
or normative.7  Sex stereotypes can be descriptive beliefs about
the way that men are and that women are, at least typically-for
example, aggressive versus nurturing.78 But stereotypes can also
be normative beliefs about the way that men should be and women
70. Id. at 1316 (emphases added).
71. Some courts and commentators have taken it too far, though, and bluntly
claimed that Title VII and equal protection sex discrimination standards are the
same. E.g., Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009); Jason Lee, Lost
in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 423 (2012). But that is
largely a side point.
72. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphases added) (quoting Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se:
Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 563 (2007)).
74. Id. (emphases added) (quoting Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why
We Need to Include Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 392 (2001)).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989).




should be, breadearners versus homemakers, for example." The
plurality in Price Waterhouse, in some of its most widely quoted
language, invoked both descriptive and normative stereotypes:
"[in the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender."so In language
encompassing both descriptive and normative stereotypes, the
Price Waterhouse plurality insisted: "[a] s for the legal relevance of
sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group ... ."8 So, Glenn v.
Brumby appears to read equal protection law (drawing on Title VII
law) to protect transgender employees, as all others, from
discrimination based on either descriptive sex stereotyping or
normative sex stereotyping.
Another thing to note is that the Eleventh Circuit did not
simply limit its discussion in Glenn to behavior or even
appearance. It also quoted Professor Flynn's suggestion that
"other personal characteristics" that "differ from traditional
gender norms" define transgender persons.8 2 Thus, when the court
concludes that "discrimination against a transgender individual
because of her gender-nonconformity is sex discrimination,
whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or gender[,]"" its
notion of gender nonconformity should be read broadly. After all,
it approvingly quotes the Schroer court's suggestion that "[iut may
be time to revisit [the] conclusion.. . that discrimination against
transsexuals because they are transsexuals is literally
discrimination because of sex."" Glenn also quoted a federal
district court's suggestion in Kastl v. Maricopa County Community
College District that "[nleither a woman with male genitalia nor a
man with stereotypically female anatomy, such as breasts, may be
deprived of a benefit or privilege of employment by reason of that
nonconforming trait."85 "An individual cannot be punished because
79. Id.
80. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.
81. Id. at 251.
82. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Taylor
Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender Rights in
the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 392
(2001)).
83. Id. at 1317.
84. Id. (quoting Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006)).
85. Id. at 1317 (quoting Kast1 v. Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coil. Dist., No. Civ. 02-
1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004)). But cf Kastl v.
Maricopa Cnty. Comm. Coll. Dist., No.06-16907, 2006 WL 2460636, at *6 (D. Ariz.
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of his or her perceived gender-nonconformity," the court of appeals
wrote in Glenn," and thus by focusing, as much federal
antidiscrimination law does, on the mind of the perpetrator, the
court leaves ample room to conclude that in early twenty-first
century U.S. society, being transgender is gender-nonconforming.
The Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby does not quite go there,
holding less specifically that "a government agent violates the
Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of sex-based discrimination
when he or she fires a transgender or transsexual employee
because of his or her gender non-conformity." But it also
properly held that Sewell Brumby's admission that his decision to
fire Vandy Beth "was based on 'the sheer fact of the transition ['"M
constituted "direct evidence to support the district court's
conclusion that Brumby acted on the basis of Glenn's gender non-
conformity."8
Older judicial arguments against such Title VII coverage
either do not carry weight in light of current approaches to federal
statutory interpretation or are facilely sophistic. Prior to Price
Waterhouse,9o courts sometimes said that Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination "does not embrace transsexual discrimination
[sic]"" because Congress did not intend to forbid anti-trans
discrimination. 92 To the extent that such cases were attempting to
analyze "the term 'sex'"93 in isolation without considering the
Aug. 22, 2006) affd 325 Fed. App'x. 492 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that "Plaintiff has
failed to meet her burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
because she has provided no evidence that she was a biological female and member
of a protected class while she was employed by Defendant").
86. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1319 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 1320.
88. Id. at 1321.
89. Id.
90. And sometimes afterward. See Creed v. Family Express Corp., No. 3:06-
CV-465RM, 2009 WL 35237 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009) (holding firing of transgender
employee based on failure to conform to dress code and grooming policy was not
actionable sex discrimination); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., No. 2:04CV616DS,
2005 WL 1505610, at *4-5 (D. Utah June 24, 2005) affd on other grounds, 502 F.3d
1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding Price Waterhouse inapplicable to anti-transsexual
discrimination); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL
31098541 (E.D. La. 2002); Cox v. Denny's Inc., No. 98-1085-CIV-J-16B, 1999
WL 1317785 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1999); Underwood v. Archer Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 857
F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994); Dobre v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp.
284 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
91. Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977). The
overruling of the Holloway rationale was recognized in Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000).
92. Id. at 663. See also, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084-85
(7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
93. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663.
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notion of "discrimina[tion] ... because of ... sex,"" their argument
was fatally incomplete.95 But even to the extent that the older
cases' reasoning might be taken as addressing the meaning of sex
discrimination, they still fail.
As numerous commentators and adjudicators have noted ,
the Supreme Court has declared that "statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,
and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are govemed.""
Discrimination against persons because they are transgender is an
evil comparable to discrimination against women because they are
women, against men because they are men,"9 or (what anti-trans
discrimination at least in part is,) against either because of sex
stereotypes.99 Moreover, Price Waterhouse made clear that Title
VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is not limited to banning
discrimination against men because they are men or against
women because they are women. As noted above, the Court there
concluded that an employer's excluding women, say, was not
necessary for a violation; Title VII is violated where employers
discriminatorily require people to conform to sex stereotypes.o00
The text of Title VII is thus honored, its purposes served, and the
Supreme Court's precedents respected by interpreting the Act to
ban anti-transgender discrimination regardless of Congress's
specific intent.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
95. See, e.g., Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing only "the
plain meaning of the term 'sex'").
96. See, e.g., Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Serv., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL
34350174, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d
293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011);
Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *9-10 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20,
2012); Julie A. Greenberg, What do Scalia and Thomas Really Think About Sex?
Title VII and Gender Nonconformity Discrimination: Protection for Transsexuals,
Intersexuals, Gays and Lesbians, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149, 158 (2002); William
C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining "Because of Sex"
to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL.
L. REV. 487, 528 (2011); Weiss, supra note 36, at 626.
97. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). Oncale
was a case brought under Title VII challenging same-sex harassment as actionable
sex discrimination.
9& See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting discrimination based on sex, in its plain
meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they
are women and against men because they are men.").
99. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 228 (1989).
100. Id. at 256-58.
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Earlier cases also sometimes said that discrimination against
a transgender employee was discrimination because of change of
sex, not discrimination because of sex.' But this is specious. As
the EEOC and the federal district judge it quoted in its Macy
decision explained, and as many of us studying and working in
this area have long appreciated, discrimination against an
employee who changes her religion is discrimination because of
religion, an employment decision in which religion is treated as a
relevant factor.102 The same is true when a person "changes" or
needs to "change" or is perceived to need or want to "change" her
sex.o'0 This analogy underscores the conclusion advanced here
earlier, and reached by some courts, agencies, and even more
scholars, that anti-trans discrimination is literally discrimination
because of sex.'" Couple these arguments with the fact that
Congress amended Title VII to ensure that sex need only be "a
motivating factor" in an adverse employment decision for it to be
covered by the statute, and that should be sufficient to put to
rest the "change of sex" objection to Title VII coverage of anti-
transgender discrimination.
These developments and arguments interpreting Title VII to
reach anti-transgender discrimination have, however, been
criticized on various grounds by some scholars, even ones clearly
sympathetic to the justice claims of transgender persons. 0 6 People
have contended that these developments and arguments do not fit
all of the lower court precedents in this area of law;so0 that the
protection offered is incomplete or under-inclusive;'" that they
reinforce gender norms or, contrarily, do not allow gender norms
enough latitude;'" that they conflate normative and descriptive
101. E.g., Grossman v. Bernards Twp. Bd. of Educ., (1975) 11 E.P.D. (CCH) P
10,686, at pp. 6884-85 (D.N.J. 1975), affd mem., 538 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1976).
102. See, e.g., Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *13-14
(E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
103. I use scare quotes here because all of my conversations and reading suggest
that transgender persons taking actions in "transition" are confirming the sex they
are and have long or always been, bringing their bodies into conformity with their
gender identities.
104. See e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
106. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional
Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 653 (2009).
107. See, e.g., Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARv. J.L. & GENDER
423, 451 (2012).
108. See, e.g., id. at 454.
109. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping
Prohibition at Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 795 (2013).
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notions of stereotypes;no and that they erase the specificity of
transgender identity and do not capture the heart of why people
discriminate against transgender persons."' Some of these
scholarly arguments seem addressed to more theoretical questions
and may not all have been addressing the bottom-line question of
whether or not Title VII's ban on sex discrimination should be
interpreted to forbid anti-transgender discrimination." For that
inquiry, which is the focus of this Article, these concerns would be
misplaced or lack force as a reason to reject the sex stereotyping or
other broad understandings of forbidden sex discrimination, and,
accordingly, they should not forestall courts from interpreting
Title VII to forbid anti-trans discrimination, thus simultaneously
advancing sex/gender equality and transgender equality.
Some scholars object to certain trans-protective positions on
the ground that those arguments are not consistent with lower
court decisions about the reach of Title VII's ban on sex
discrimination. Non-liberal perfectionist Kimberly Yuracko, for
example, has criticized judicial pronouncements that sex must be
irrelevant and scholars who agree as offering an "implausible"
interpretation of Title VII's ban on sex stereotyping."3  But the
110. See, e.g., Glazer & Kramer, supra note 106, at 663.
111. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 107, at 445.
112. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note 54, at 86 (characterizing one decision
reaching anti-trans discrimination with Title VII's ban on sex discrimination as
"simultaneously a victory for trans rights yet ... also implausible, unstable, and in
some ways undesirable") (emphasis added); id. (describing the aim of her article "to
reflect on some critical conceptual problems in sex discrimination law"); Glazer &
Kramer, supra note 106, at 660 (disclaiming intent "to argue that the outcomes in
cases [protecting against anti-transgender discrimination under Title VII] should
change").
113. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 109, at 775 ("It follows that if the trait-
neutrality reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is implausibly expansive,
then the narrow libertarian principle is implausible as well."); cf id. at 780 ("Yet, to
be workable in a society with rich gender norms, trait neutrality ... [iun practice
would be culturally transformative, not conservative. It is this fact that perhaps
best explains why courts have not applied the prohibition as a trait-neutrality
requirement."). I believe that this is the clear and fair meaning of Yuracko's
written words. Although at one point Yuracko's article conditionally says "that if
the trait-neutrality reading of the sex stereotyping prohibition is implausibly
expansive, then the narrow libertarian principle is implausible as well." Id. at 775
(emphasis added). Elsewhere, she bluntly argues that this reading "is" not
"plausible." Id. at 761.
I do not find this suggestion of the implausibility of Title VII's banning trait
discrimination established in the article; after all, Yuracko admits that "trait
neutrality simply restates a conventional understanding of the sex discrimination
prohibition that has been used in a range of contexts." Id. at 776. The only way I
could see the "implausibility" suggestion substantiated might be if the standard
were plausibility-as-an-explainer-of-lower-court-case-outcomes, which would give
no one purchase to say that any court is wrong; if courts rule inconsistently with
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primary reason Professor Yuracko has offered in support of this
position has been that court decisions have not uniformly
embraced that view."' Similarly, women's studies professor Anna
Kirkland suggests that some of the decisions protecting trans
people under Title VII cannot be taken at face value because
"courts still uphold employers' rights to require sex-specific
grooming standards . .. and sometimes excuse sex-specific
hiring ......" 15  And non-trans legal advocate for trans persons
Jason Lee likewise observes that "[t]he per se approaches conflict
with existing Title VII precedent.""'
The decisions upholding various forms of sex discrimination
by employers that these scholars see as in tension or inconsistent
with the logic of the plain reading of Title VII are not appropriate
interpretations of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination."7  The
poor reasoning of many of the cases addressing transgender
plaintiffs suing under Title VII makes "fit with lower court case
law" a particularly inapt standard by which to judge theories
about the statute's scope.n8 Moreover, in the multi-jurisdictional
U.S. legal system, the fact that courts disagree about the meaning
of a statute does not establish that broader understandings are
incorrect."9 And those such as the Commissioners of the EEOC
who have argued in favor of a robust application of Title VII to
forbid anti-trans discrimination are not purporting to fit the
theory to all available precedents as if they were data determining
a mathematical function. We espouse a normative view, one that
can condemn certain decisions as wrong,1 2 0 So observing that lower
each other, then we would be reduced to saying that Title VII is indeterminate, and
otherwise the law is simply what the courts say it is, which would be too deferential
to courts.
114. See, e.g., id. at 779 (observing that "courts have not interpreted the sex
stereotyping prohibition to require trait neutrality of [what Yuracko criticizes as]
this formalistic sort"); cf id. at 760 (writing descriptively that she "seek[s] to
uncover the demands-and limits-of the [sex stereotyping] prohibition as it is
actually being applied").
115. Kirkland, supra note 54, at 84.
116. Lee, supra note 107, at 450-51; see also id. at 454 (addressing supposed
underprotection of people who only live part-time in the role of their gender
identity and of people who might not be visibly not conforming to the role of their
natally assigned sex).
117. See generally, e.g., David B. Cruz, Making Up Women: Casinos, Cosmetics,
and Title VII, 5 NEV. L.J. 240 (2004) (criticizing cases upholding sex-discriminatory
dress codes for employees).
118. Lee, supra note 107, at 451.
119. See, e.g., Glazer & Kramer, supra note 106, at 659-60.
120. Thus, I think it a misreading to characterize Glazer, Kramer, and Kirkland
as "scholars who adopt a more libertarian view of the prohibition at work in the
cases," Yuracko, supra note 109, at 790 (emphasis added), the phrase Yuracko used
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court decisions disagree is not the kind of argument that can,
without more, undermine our doctrinal conclusions.
Another common complaint about approaches to Title VII-
particularly reliance on the notion of sex stereotyping-that would
hold anti-trans discrimination unlawful, is that the protection
offered is incomplete or under-inclusive. "[T]he prohibition will
not be a panacea," Yuracko writes;"' Lee worries that "a plaintiff
may not be able to demonstrate conclusively that animus toward
his or her transgender status motivated an employer's action"12
and thus worries about inability to reach "'second generation
employment discrimination.'" 1 23 But these are problems with Title
VII or with law generally-there are always problems outside the
scope of a statute or its implementation. Perhaps Title VII might
profitably be expanded to provide workers more protection. But
that is not a reason to shrink from applying Title VII as it stands
now categorically to prohibit discrimination by covered employers
that can be proven to turn on the employee's transgender status,
transition, or gender expression.
Another set of concerns about Title VII protection from anti-
transgender discrimination centers on stereotypes: the fear that
such protection reinforces gender norms or, contrarily but
sometimes held by the same critics, do not allow gender norms
enough latitude. As to the former, Yuracko argues, for example,
that "[iln practice, the sex stereotyping prohibition encourages
plaintiffs to endorse and adopt highly stereotyped gender
packages . ."124 "While the prohibition has extended Title VII's
protection to workers who had previously been excluded," she
admits, Yuracko argues that "it has done so by relying on and
reinforcing traditional gender categories."'125 "By doing so,
to label her description of what she thinks courts are doing even though "the courts
themselves have not yet explicitly articulated" it in that fashion, id. at 768 n.48.
121. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 804.
122. Lee, supra note 107, at 452. Lee also reads Schroer v. Billington, 577 F.
Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008), as possibly requiring that a transgender person have
surgery before being entitled to protection under Title VII. Id. at 454-55. But
besides equating surgery as a potentially sufficient condition with surgery as a
necessary condition, this reading also over-reads "change . .. anatomical sex" as
necessarily meaning having genital surgery, see id. at 455, where hormone therapy
and other non-genital surgeries might also be contemplated.
123. Id. at 451.
124. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 761; cf Mary Anne Case, Unpacking Package
Deals: Separate Spheres Are Not the Answer, 75 DENVER U. L. REV. 1305, 1306
(1998) (repudiating "division of life and its activities into two separate but equal
and opposite gendered spheres").
125. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 762.
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moreover, the prohibition actually protects some individuals[1 2 6 at
the expense of the class whose subordination (stemming from
socially salient gender norms) remains intact."1 27
Likewise, Lee contends that reaching anti-transgender
discrimination as sex discrimination requires courts to reinforce
stereotypes.m Following Liz Glazer and Zak Kramer, Lee believes
that
Adjudication of ,a Title VII sex-stereotyping claim generally
requires that a court first determine the plaintiffs "anchor
gender"-. . . the gender most commonly associated with the
plaintiffs sex. Male plaintiffs are thus presumed to have
masculine anchor genders and female plaintiffs are
correspondingly presumed to have feminine anchor genders. A
court will then compare the plaintiffs anchor gender to his or
her "expressive gender"-the gender presented by the
plaintiffs appearance, conduct, and behavior. If an employer
has discriminated against an individual because, in the
employer's view, the two genders do not align, such action
constitutes impermissible sex-stereotyping in violation of Title
VII.1 29
This, Lee thinks, "requires that courts reconstruct the very sex
stereotypes that the doctrine purports to disdain.""'0
But these authors overstate what a court must do to rule for
a transgender plaintiff. As Yuracko acknowledges, her idea that
in practice courts apply a "burden-shifting framework-in which
[gender-norm] conformity demands viewed as highly costly by the
court trigger a presumption of protection that the employer then
bears the burden of overcoming"13 is not part of Title VII
126. Not mere individuals, but a class of persons, I would maintain, eliminating
the exaggerated discrepancy between a "class" of women and "individual"
transgender persons.
127. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 762. It is not clear, though, how denying Title
VII protection to transgender men and women would improve the lot of (cisgender)
women under the statute.
As phrased here, Yuracko's are empirical claims, but she does little if
anything to establish their truth. Perhaps she meant to say things like "could" or
"might" and so only makes a conceptual claim-later in Soul of a Woman Yuracko
invokes the supposed "fact that judicial conceptions of gender may become real-
affecting how people view themselves[,]" id. at 802,-but that is not how the words
of the article seem to read.
128. Lee, supra note 107, at 444. Lee cites Laura Grenfell, Embracing Law's
Categories: Anti-discrimination Laws and Transgenderism, 15 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 51, 93-94 (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 171-72
(2004); and Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WAsH. U. L. REV. 287,
300-01 (2011).
129. Lee, supra note 107, at 444 (footnotes omitted).
130. Id.
131. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 761.
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doctrine.132 Hence, even if her proffered'3 reconstructed rule did
"encourage[ a particular kind of gender performance,"'" that
would be a problem for her rule, not for the actual rule courts have
articulated. Similarly, Kramer, Glazer, and Lee's notion of anchor
genders is at best a heuristic to help think about Title VII sex
discrimination doctrine. But that doctrine does not actually
confine protection to a limited class of persons and so does not
require courts to decide the sex/gender class to which a plaintiff
belongs. Disparate treatment doctrine asks about whether an
employer took an action because of an employee's sex, a question
answerable by reference to the employer's beliefs about the
plaintiffs sex. 135  "What matters . .. is that in the mind of the
perpetrator the discrimination is related to the sex of the victim."136
As the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse read Title VII, the
statute reflected "Congress' intent to forbid employers to take
gender into account in making employment decisions."37  "The
critical inquiry," Price Waterhouse explained, "the one commanded
132. See, e.g., id. at 785-86 ("I suggest that, while not doing so explicitly, courts
have in fact adopted a burden-shifting framework for analyzing and applying the
sex stereotyping prohibition.. .. "); id. at 794 (admitting her "reading of the sex
stereotyping prohibition as establishing a burden-shifting framework for analyzing
claims is certainly more modest than courts' rhetoric suggests"); id at 768 n.48
(arguing that "the courts' prohibition on sex stereotyping is complicated and
nuanced in ways the courts themselves have not yet explicitly articulated"). This
demotion of doctrine to mere "rhetoric" disserves the transgender people who would
otherwise benefit from the robust sex discrimination doctrine articulated by courts.
133. Id. at 804 (contending that "the burden-shifting framework actually has
much to recommend it").
134. Id. at 798.
135. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dept. of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio
1994) (denying summary judgment to defendant in case brought by plaintiff likely
believed by employers to be Native American). "The EEOC has provided clear
guidance that employment discrimination based on the misperceptions of an
employee's race, national origin, or religion violates Title VII." Charity Williams,
Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects Employees
from Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
357, 371 (2008) (citing, inter alia, EEOC COMP. MAN. 15-II (2006), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html ("Discrimination against an
individual based on a perception of his or her race violates Title VII even if that
perception is wrong.")). But cf, e.g., Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D.
Tenn. 2004) (granting defendant summary judgment where plaintiff pled that
defendant discriminated because he perceived defendant to be Indian or Middle
Eastern, citing no precedent and, at 850, deploying "protected class" notion
unsupported by Title VII text).
136. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added)
(discussing the Gender-Motivated Violence Act (GMVA), after concluding, at 1200-
01, that "Congress intended proof of gender motivation under the GMVA to proceed
in the same way that proof of discrimination on the basis of sex or race is shown
under Title VII").
137. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989).
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by the words of [Title VI], is whether gender was a factor in the
employment decision at the moment it was made."'" And so
generally Title VII is violated when an "employer relie[s] upon sex-
based considerations in coming to its decision." 3 9
Conversely, some scholars-indeed, some of the same
scholars who complain that acknowledging the gender
discrimination in anti-transgender discrimination reinforces sex
stereotypes-fret that doing so does not leave employers sufficient
latitude to require their employees to conform to gender norms.
Professor Yuracko, for example, using passive voice that obscures
whom she's privileging, writes: "[g]ender norms are not only
pervasive, they are also, often, comfortable and comforting."14 0
Comforting to whom? Not those who lose their job because of an
employer's insistence on them. Yet Yuracko worries, like anti-
feminist Phyllis Schlafly,14 ' about the prospect of a tyranny of
unisex: Yuracko argues that for employers uncomfortable with
being barred from prescribing distinct gender codes for men and
women, "compliance [with Title VII] might instead take the form
of highly circumscribed gender codes confined to a banal
androgynous core." 4 2 All this would come, Yuracko fears, "at the
cost of a loss of freedom for gender conformists and nonconformists
alike."1 4 3
But their "reduced" freedom would be formally equal, so
employers would not be able to use market leverage to reinforce a
normative view of sex difference, which would be a good thing.'"
Gender nonconformers would gain freedom from being sartorially
138. Id. at 241 (first emphasis added).
139. Id. at 242.
140. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 778. No citation is offered to support this
empirical claim.
141. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, New Drive Afoot to Pass Equal Rights
Amendment, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/27/AR2007032702357.html ("In the 1970s, Schlafly
and others argued that the ERA would lead to women being drafted by the military
and to public unisex bathrooms. Today, she warns lawmakers that its passage
would compel courts to approve same-sex marriages and deny Social Security
benefits for housewives and widows.") (partially quoted in Jennifer Levi & Daniel
Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
133, 139-40 (2010)); Eagle Forum (Wash., D.C.), June 1983 ("No one can guarantee
that ERA won't result in abortion-funding, gay rights, drafting women, unisex
insurance, and more power to the Federal Courts-unless amendments are added
which prevent ERA from doing those horribles.") (emphasis omitted) (quoted in
Twiss Butler, Abortion Law: "Unique Problem for Women" or Sex Discrimination?, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 136 n.16 (1991)).
142. Yuracko, supra note 109, at 778.
143. Id. at 779.
144. See id. at 779-80.
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marked as one sex, in at least this context, if people of all sexes
have to be allowed to wear the same things. All persons would
remain free to adhere to whatever gendered dress conventions
they wish outside the workplace.
For another iteration of the 'people like gender' lament,
consider Professor Kirkland, who believes that many transgender
persons "seek or occupy an alternative gender [to the one they
were assigned at birth] precisely because it is meaningful and full
of content for the dignified individuality they want to construct." 14
If sex stereotyping proscriptions are enforced robustly, "[h]ow will
we know the difference," she worries, "between an oppressive
script forced on someone and the very meaningful content of many
people's lives?"'46 She continues, speculating that
[Plerhaps some norms of gendered appearing-in-the-world as
well as moments and places of same-sex privacy are deeply
meaningful cultural practices reflected in the workplace rather
than oppressive stereotypes, and thus simply banning them
does not seem right. They are not always rooted in the
subordination of the other, that is, and [some people] want to
take their meanings and contexts one by one in deciding
whether they are.
I do not doubt that some, even many, transgender persons
may feel generally at home in the gender norms traditionally
associated with the gender with which they identify, and I would
not want to legally interdict them from embracing such norms.
Happily, though, one need not do so to resolve the problems
Kirkland fears. The simplest way to determine whether "an
oppressive gender script" is being "forced" on someone is to see
whether the law or an employer is insisting on gender conformity
in some context that a person challenges.' 48 This would not
identify all gender oppression, but it should ameliorate any warm
fuzzy feeling that the gender demand at issue is somehow benign.
After all, Title VII does not ban oppressive stereotypes; it bans sex
discrimination, including that based on sex or gender stereotypes,
whether or not someone deems it oppressive."' The further
problem with Kirkland's suggestion that social or cultural
approbation of gender norms is "meaningful" and should be
protected is that this would allow imposition/unequal constraints
145. Kirkland, supra note 54, at 91 (possible footnote omitted).
146. Id. (possible footnote omitted).
147. Id. at 108-09.
148. Id.
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012).
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on freedom justified by majority comfort.5 e If there really is a
social or cultural norm supporting a particular gender practice, its
devotees should be comfortable enough to trust in its survival
absent legal coercion of dissenters. If, conversely, the norm would
be imperiled if it were not mandatory (enforced by laws and/or
economic power), that should be sufficient evidence at a minimum
to establish a prima facie case that the norm is unjustly denying
persons equal liberty. The burden then, in light of a sad past and
ongoing history of sex discrimination, should be on supporters to
defend such gendered practices with particularity and in a
compelling way.
One less common complaint about sex stereotyping
arguments is that they supposedly conflate normative and
descriptive notions of stereotypes. Professor Kirkland, for
example, wonders: "[a]re the complex realities of gendered labor
in family life the same thing as the fact that women outlive men?
What is lost in collapsing them jurisprudentially as
stereotypes ... ?"" Yet she offers no reason to read the doctrine
as improperly failing to distinguish between descriptive sex
generalizations and normative of prescriptive sex role demands. 5 2
Yes, both are labeled "stereotypes" and condemned by sex equality
jurisprudence."' But this is appropriate. When law relies on
either, it restricts liberty differentially not based on unavoidable
differences in human capacities, but due to gendered ideologies."'
The fact that law restrains use of both prescribed and observed
gender differences under the rubric of "stereotypes" does not mean
that rights will inevitably be narrowed or "mischaracterized." 1 5
The charge that narrowing is symptomatic of the law's use of
"stereotypes" goes unexplained, and the charge of
mischaracterization mistakenly presumes that rights have an
essence. "Whether or not there are Platonic forms, pure essences
150. See Kirkland, supra note 54, at 108-09.
151. Id. at 102.
152. Id. at 102-03.
153. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 77-81 (addressing descriptive and
prescriptive or normative stereotypes).
154. See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 51, at 1007-08 (2002) (developing the ideology
point, including by arguing that "as predicates for differential distribution of rights,
privileges, or obligations," average or statistical "sex or gender differences are
indeed ideological").
155. "[Tlhere is no reason to think the Smith case will have the wide
reverberations it seems capable of setting off. This is not simple disappointment in
one case; rather, it is symptomatic of a primary mode of gender regulation in the
law in which the concept of sex stereotyping simultaneously extends rights and also
narrows and mischaracterizes them." Kirkland, supra note 54, at 107.
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that exist independent of human recognition, those are not what
law uses. Law is a human project, using human categories
instrumentally for human purposes."" Legal rights against sex
discrimination should embrace both rights against discrimination
that is based on insistence that men and women be different
(normative stereotypes) and rights against discrimination that is
based on assumptions that men and women are different
(descriptive stereotypes). Each may take varying forms, but that
alone is not enough to condemn Title VII's treatment of sex/gender
stereotypes, let alone reason to reject extending protection from
anti-transgender discrimination under the banner of rules against
sex discrimination.
Perhaps more seriously, another critique of treating anti-
trans discrimination as unlawful sex discrimination based on
gender stereotyping maintains that this misses the gravamen of
the discrimination trans people face and/or erases the specificity of
transgender identity. Scholars such as Kirkland, Lee, Glazer, and
Kramer suggest that treating anti-trans discrimination as sex
discrimination, particularly under a gender stereotyping rubric,
improperly denies the existence of trans people as trans people."7
Professors Glazer and Kramer, for example, in rejecting what they
perceive as "the prevalent understanding of transgender identity
as gender nonconformity,"'5 criticize Title VII doctrine on the
ground that it supposedly "require[s] plaintiffs to cast themselves
as gender-nonconforming men [in the case of transgender women]
or women [in the case of transgender men]."'"9 "In order to state
an actionable claim," they write, a transgender female plaintiff
"must transform herself into a man who just wants to wear
women's clothing."'60 But this misconstrues Title VII's disparate
treatment doctrine, which for better or for worse in different cases
156. David B. Cruz, Getting Sex "Right:" Heteronormativity and Biologism in
Trans and Intersex Marriage Litigation and Scholarship, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLY 203, 217 (2010).
157. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note 54, at 108; Lee, supra note 107, at 446-47;
Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 651, 654 (2009).
158. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 157, at 654.
159. Id. at 659. To be clear, Glazer and Kramer do "believe that transgender
rights should fall within the ambit of Title VII's existing protection against sex
discrimination." Id. at 660. However, they "are concerned with the path taken by
courts in reaching [trans-protective] outcomes." Id.; see also id. at 664 (suggesting
that their "critique of anti-discrimination law" is "most accurately characterize [d]"
by the argument "that the currently protected categories are not being used
properly").
160. Id. at 667.
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focuses on the motivation of the perpetrator of discrimination. 161
So, a plaintiff could plead that the employer perceived her as a
man without asserting that it was in fact the case that she was a
man.
Alternatively but relatedly, some scholars suggest that it is
not sex per se, but people's profound discomfort with the idea that
our sex may be within our control, that lies beneath anti-
transgender discrimination. Glazer and Stevie Tran insist that
"[wihat bothers society most about transgender people is that they
make choices about aspects of their gender that society believes
are not their choices to make."162 Kirkland asserts that it is not
mere stereotypes about "contingent personal choices"" but beliefs
about the nature of gendered identity that animate anti-trans
discrimination. x" But if this complaint were taken to weigh
against using Title VII to reach anti-transgender discrimination, it
would recapitulate the error of pre-Price Waterhouse denials that
discrimination because of change of X is discrimination because of
X. Were anti-trans discrimination founded on attitudes about
choices about sex, that would be no objection to reaching anti-
trans discrimination with a ban on sex discrimination unless
discrimination about choices regarding or change of X is not
discrimination because of X-but it is. This concern also wrongly
treats law as an exercise in philosophical purity rather than as a
tool to accomplish human aims.165
161. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lake Cnty. Dept. of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio
1994); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2000).
162. Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, Transgenderless, 35 HARV. J.
GENDER & L. 399,418 (2012).
163. Kirkland, supra note 54, at 95.
164. Id. at 94-95.
165. Cf Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 500 (2001) (arguing that "[ilt
mischaracterizes the nature of laws that discriminate against lesbians and gay
men to see them as primarily harming women (or even as harming women as much
as they harm gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals) [and] mischaracterizes laws that
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation to see them as primarily justified by
sexism rather than by homophobia"). Yet nothing in sex discrimination arguments
requires that they capture the "primary" basis for unlawful discrimination; if the
law against sex discrimination can help lesbigay people (in the context Stein
discusses) or transgender people (the focus of this Article), I would want to see
more powerful arguments about unintended harms before abandoning this legal
tool. Accord Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 520
(2001) ("Edward Stein's critique of the sex discrimination argument for gay rights
is concerned about what the argument leaves out. I do not want to leave them out,




Glazer and Kramer also say that to determine whether a
victim of discrimination may use Title VII for redress, "the
individual must determine whether he [sic] fits within a category
against which Title VII prohibits discrimination.""' But this is not
true. The employer's beliefs/mental states are generally all that
matter doctrinally."' Again following loose language, Glazer and
Kramer wrongly say the question is whether discrimination was
against persons "'because of their membership in a ... protected
category,""' but there's no need to limit "'because of sex" to require
actual membership, rather than employer action predicated upon
a belief about their membership."9 They acknowledge that they
"favor a system of anti-discrimination laws in which the plaintiffs
sense of herself rather than the defendant's perception of her
forms the basis for an actionable discrimination claim," and so "it
matters very little to [them] why individuals discriminate against
transgender people."'o However, at least in this Article, they do
not indicate recognition that they would totally revamp U.S. anti-
discrimination law, both statutory and constitutional (equal
protection), which turns, emphatically though not exclusively,
upon the discriminators' beliefs and motivations. 7' I doubt they
would want, and I certainly would not insist, that transgender
persons bear the potentially steep costs of giving up Title VII anti-
discrimination protection as the first step toward what would need
to be a foundational reworking of U.S. anti-discrimination laws
across the board. 172
Title VII has had an important impact over the past half
century, but has yet to be used to its full potential. If courts
acknowledge that anti-transgender discrimination is gender/sex
discrimination under Title VII, courts can deepen their
appreciation of the social constraints that gender norms place on
166. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 157, at 661.
167. They fall into the common imprecision of referring to "protected categories,"




170. Id. at 666 (citing Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Trans Fat,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337129 (reviewing ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT
RIGHTS: DILEMMAS OF DIFFERENCE AND PERSONHOOD (2008))).
171. See, e.g., Carlton Waterhouse, Abandon Hope All Ye That Enter? Equal
Protection, Title VI, and the Divine Comedy of Environmental Justice, 20 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 76-86 (2009) (summarizing important scholarly literature on the
"perpetrator's perspective").
172. After all, Glazer and Kramer "believe that transgender rights should fall
within the ambit of Title VI's existing protection against sex discrimination."
Glazer & Kramer, supra note 157, at 660.
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human beings, and advance transgender equality and gender
equality simultaneously. That would be a truly worthy legacy of
the Civil Rights Act for which so many worked so hard.

